



Kansans at Risk: Strengthened Data Breach 




Data collection provides attractive opportunities for businesses to 
improve services, enhance marketing efforts, and generate revenue 
through data sharing practices.1  As a result, businesses today are 
collecting mass quantities of data, leading to devastating data breaches.2  
Juniper Research projects that United States-based breaches will account 
for the majority of all data breaches in the world by 2023 because of data 
stockpiling practices.3  Consumers, businesses, and lawmakers are 
struggling to adapt to an ever-changing technological landscape. 
Today, data breaches are inevitable.4  How can businesses address the 
threat of hackers with the means to change, adapt, and persist?  Of course, 
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 1.   Adam C. Uzialko, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re Doing with It), 
BUS. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018, 7:25 AM), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-
collecting-data.html [https://perma.cc/JQG5-53RR]; see also Mark Sangster, 2018 Trends Overview: 
Compliance, Privacy and Security Family Tree, LAW.COM (Feb. 8, 2019, 12:25 PM), 
https://www.law.com/2019/02/08/2018-trends-overview-compliance-privacy-and-security-family-
tree/ [https://perma.cc/WSX9-LMDP] (“[C]onsumer preferences and behaviors are the raw materials 
for big data analytics that become a commodity for sale.”). 
 2.   Sangster, supra note 1.   
 3.   10 Cyber Security Facts and Statistics for 2018, SYMANTEC, https://us.norton.com/ 
internetsecurity-emerging-threats-10-facts-about-todays-cybersecurity-landscape-that-you-should-
know.html [https://perma.cc/A7MN-PW22] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) (presenting statistics from a 
2018 study done by Juniper Research, a marketing research specialist).  
 4.   See Beth Givens, Executive Director of Privacy Rights Clearing House, Data Breach 
Readiness and Follow-Up: Being Prepared for the Inevitable, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE 
(Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.privacyrights.org/blog/data-breach-readiness-and-follow-being-
prepared-inevitable [https://perma.cc/XB9H-BLPQ] (stating that “[i]t’s not a matter of IF – rather, it’s 
a matter of WHEN a breach will happen.”). 
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businesses that take protection of consumer data seriously may still fall 
victim to a breach.  However, regulation is necessary to deter data-
collecting entities that shrug their shoulders at the looming threat of a data 
breach and to incentivize preemptive action to safeguard consumer data.  
One common and effective form of data privacy regulation is state data 
breach notification statutes, which mandate notification to individual 
consumers when personal information is compromised.  State breach 
notification statutes encourage businesses to invest more in data security 
through the threat of reputational harm and subsequent customer loss.  
Further, notification allows consumers the opportunity to mitigate or 
eliminate their risk of identity theft.  The effectiveness of these statutes, 
then, hinges on: (1) whether they are strong enough to deter reckless data 
storage, and (2) whether they provide the consumer with adequate 
information so they can protect themselves from identity theft. 
The Kansas Protection of Consumer Information (“KPCI”) statutes 
governing data breach notification rank among the most lenient in the 
United States.5  Mostly untouched since their enactment in 2006,6 the 
KPCI statutes are antiquated in today’s data-driven world, including only 
a narrow definition of “personal information”7 and requiring entities to 
notify consumers within an unspecified time frame.8  Further, the statutes 
do not specify what information businesses need to include in 
notifications.9  Failure to strengthen notification requirements leaves 
Kansas’s business infrastructure weak and consumers vulnerable. 
In the past, Kansas data breach victims have sought remedy in federal 
court on diversity jurisdiction grounds.10  However, no data breach 
litigation has reached the Kansas Appellate Court or Kansas Supreme 
Court.  The barriers Kansas data breach victims face in bringing suit and 
the many possible causes of action they may assert are beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
This Note instead explores the limitations of the KPCI statutes and 
proposes modifications.  Part II of this Note provides a broad overview of 
                                                          
 5.   Ellen Zhang, Do Your State Laws Protect You? The United States Data Breach Heatmap, 
DIG. GUARDIAN: DATA INSIDER (Aug. 15, 2018), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/do-your-state-
laws-protect-you-united-states-data-breach-heatmap [https://perma.cc/SGZ5-WVAB] (ranking 
notification laws in all fifty states and assigning Kansas a two out of five, with a rating of one being 
the least restrictive). 
 6.   KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01–7a04 (Supp. 2017).  Section 50-7a03, relating to destruction 
of consumer records, was repealed in 2016. 
 7.   Id. § 50-7a01(g).  
 8.   Id. § 50-7a02(a)–(h). 
 9.   Id. § 50-7a02(a). 
 10.   See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158 
(D. Minn. 2015). 
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recent national and Kansas data breaches, a survey of state notification 
laws, and an introduction to the KPCI statutes.  Part III addresses why it is 
necessary to update the KPCI statutes and proposes expanding the 
definition of “personal information,” setting a strict notification deadline, 
requiring notification to the Kansas attorney general, and prescribing the 
form and substance of notifications.  These modifications would 
encourage businesses to closely scrutinize the data they gather, to invest 
more heavily in data security infrastructure, and to implement post-breach 
recovery systems.  Armed with more detailed notifications, Kansas 
consumers can identify what steps they need to take to mitigate or 
eliminate their risk of identity theft. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
While the number of breaches decreased in 2018,  the Identity Theft 
Resource Center’s (“ITRC”) 2018 End-of-Year Data Breach Report found 
that the number of consumer records exposed increased by 126%.11  In 
2017, there were 1,632 total breaches exposing 197,612,748 records.12  In 
2018, there were 1,244 total breaches exposing a shocking 446,515,334 
records.13  Massive data breaches involving high-profile companies 
undoubtedly contribute to these numbers.  For example, the recently 
revealed Marriott breach alone exposed 383 million records.14  The breach 
was reported to authorities on November 30, 2018,15 and involved a guest 
reservation database Marriott acquired in a 2014 acquisition of Starwood 
Hotels and Resorts Worldwide.16  Although “one of the largest [data 
breaches] in history,”17 the Marriott breach failed to unseat the 2013-2014 
                                                          
 11.   IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT 9 (2019), 
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-Aftermath_ 
FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5LC-QSXZ] [hereinafter 2018 END-OF-YEAR 
DATA BREACH REPORT]. 
 12.   Id.  
 13.   Id.  Of the 1,244 breaches reported to the ITRC in 2018, only half reported how many records 
were exposed.  Id.   
 14.   Id. at 7. 
 15.   Marriott Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 30, 2018), https://marriott.gcs-
web.com/node/28301/html [https://perma.cc/8XGK-96WF].  
 16.   David Volodzko, Marriott Breach Exposes Far More Than Just Data, FORBES (Dec. 4, 
2018, 1:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvolodzko/2018/12/04/marriott-breach-exposes-
far-more-than-just-data/#4817fd5a6297 [https://perma.cc/J986-JQ9Q]. 
 17.   Taylor Telford & Craig Timberg, Marriott Discloses Massive Data Breach Affecting Up to 
500 Million Guests, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/2018/11/30/marriott-discloses-massive-data-breach-impacting-million-guests/?noredirect= 
on&utm_term=.a7cccbafe75d [https://perma.cc/5BK7-RMXT]. 
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Yahoo breach, which currently holds the record.18  Yahoo did not formally 
disclose this breach until 2016 and 201719 and reported that “all 3 billion 
[Yahoo] accounts . . . ” were likely affected.20  Another high-profile 
breach was the 2017 Equifax breach, which exposed over 140 million 
Americans’ highly sensitive information.21 
Uber suffered its own data breach in 2016, compromising personal 
information for 57 million Uber users and 600,000 drivers.22  The 
company attempted to conceal the breach from users and regulators, 
paying off hackers with $100,000 and requiring them to sign a non-
disclosure agreement to avoid reputational harm and potential loss in 
valuation.23  This strategy backfired.  Uber recently reached a joint 
settlement with state attorneys general in all fifty states for $148 million.24  
Kansas’s share was more than $730,000.25  These breaches demonstrate 
the scale and scope of the data breach crisis.  But this is only the beginning.  
In fact, International Business Machines projects larger, more 
sophisticated, and more frequent attacks in coming years.26  In other 
words, the data breach problem is here to stay.  How we choose to respond 
will impact businesses and consumers for the foreseeable future. 
Other countries are sensitive to the immense threat data breaches pose 
                                                          
 18.   Taylor Armerding, The 18 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO (Dec. 20, 2018, 
5:01 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-
century.html [https://perma.cc/4KLE-8GUV].  
 19.   Although technically two separate breaches, the events are commonly referred to as a single 
breach.  See Matthew C. Solomon et al., Failure to Disclose a Cybersecurity Breach, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (May 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2018/05/17/failure-to-disclose-a-cybersecurity-breach/ [https://perma.cc/B6LG-SZTK]. 
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Tara Siegel Bernard et al., Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-
cyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/45AB-V3K6].  
 22.   Bill Chappell, Uber Pays $148 Million Over Yearlong Cover-Up of Data Breach, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/27/652119109/uber-pays-148-million-
over-year-long-cover-up-of-data-breach [https://perma.cc/7LVU-54LC]. 
 23.   Gabrielle Orum Hernández, Uber’s Data Breach Cover-Up Strategy May Be More Common 
Than You’d Think, CONN. L. TRIB. (Nov. 30, 2017, 3:04 PM), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/ 
sites/ctlawtribune/2017/11/30/ubers-data-breach-cover-up-strategy-may-be-more-common-than-
youd-think/ [https://perma.cc/PS8Z-G466]. 
 24.   Ben Kochman, Uber, States Strike $148M Deal to End Data Breach Dispute, LAW360 (Sept. 
26, 2018). 
 25.   Katie Moore, Uber to Pay Kansas More than $730,000 Following Data Breach, TOPEKA 
CAP. J. (Sept. 28, 2018, 1:38 PM), https://www.cjonline.com/news/20180928/uber-to-pay-kansas-
more-than-730000-following-data-breach [https://perma.cc/3BB9-H672]. 
 26.   Louis Columbus, IBM’s 2018 Data Breach Study Shows Why We’re in a Zero Trust World 
Now, FORBES (July 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2018/07/27/ibms-2018-
data-breach-study-shows-why-were-in-a-zero-trust-world-now/#68a322ab68ed [https://perma.cc/ 
M7B3-2YHZ]. 
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to consumers.  The European Union’s (“EU”) General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”), effective May 25, 2018, governs management of 
EU citizen data, breach notification, and penalties for failure to comply.27  
The GDPR requires notification to the affected consumer and to the 
European supervisory authority within seventy-two hours of discovering 
the breach.28  In addition to notification, the GDPR requires entities to 
perform risk assessments and implement data security measures relative 
to the risk.29  Entities face stiff penalties for GDPR violations—up to 
$10,000,000 or 2% of their worldwide annual revenue, whichever is 
greater.30 
In the U.S., Congress has struggled to implement national reporting 
statutes and other broad-based enforcement measures.31  There are several 
possible reasons for the continued struggle to pass these laws: technology 
is rapidly changing, making it difficult to delineate a standard of data care, 
and big tech companies regularly lobby against federal legislation 
regulating data security.32  Current federal laws governing data breaches 
tend to be industry-specific, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act33 and 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(“HIPAA”).34  The primary buffer against reckless storage of consumer 
                                                          
 27.   See Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) 
[hereinafter GDPR]. 
 28.   Id. art. 33(1). 
 29.   Id. art. 32. 
 30.   Id. art. 83. 
 31.   See generally Brett V. Newman, Note, Hacking the Current System: Congress’ Attempt to 
Pass Data Security and Breach Notification Legislation, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 437 (2015) 
(providing an overview of legislative attempts to enact federal data security laws).  See also Mark 
Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of Information Privacy and Data Breach 
Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 77–78 (Feb. 2011) (stating that 
national attempts to enact data breach notification laws have failed). 
 32.   Michael Rapoport & AnnaMaria Andriotis, Equifax Lobbied for Easier Regulation Before 
Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2017, 10:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/equifax-lobbied-
for-easier-regulation-before-data-breach-1505169330 [https://perma.cc/22KR-KYQB] (detailing 
Equifax’s attempt to lobby for less regulation and liability for credit reporting companies); Cecilia 
Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, on Its Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/26/technology/tech-industry-federal-privacy-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/3R22-TDYL] (detailing Facebook, Google, IBM, and Microsoft’s efforts to lobby 
for federal legislation overriding California’s strict data privacy laws and allowing tech companies 
more leeway in how they handle consumer data).  
 33.   15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (requiring financial institutions to protect sensitive 
information). 
 34.   Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1996) 
(enabling the Department of Health and Human Services to establish regulations for maintaining 
privacy and security of protected health information). 
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information is Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act, 
but it is not always exercised against entities when a breach occurs.35 
Enforcement may depend on administration priorities.  As one 
journalist notes, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), 
created to protect consumers from unfair financial business practices, “has 
been gutted [and] rendered toothless under the Trump administration.”36  
After the massive 2017 Equifax data breach, neither the CFPB nor the FTC 
took any enforcement action against Equifax.37 
High-profile data breaches and international focus on data security 
regulation have placed increased pressure on Congress to pass legislation 
in this area.  Several competing bills were introduced in April, November, 
and December 2018 to address data security standards and breach 
notification.38  Those in support of federal legislation believe the federal 
government is best equipped to regulate this area because of the often 
cross-jurisdictional nature of these incidents.39  Entities gathering and 
maintaining multi-resident data are faced with a disjointed, patchwork of 
state laws addressing data security and breach, many of which define “data 
                                                          
 35.   15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).  Section 5 of the FTC Act has two prongs: (1) deceptive 
practices; and (2) unfair practices.  Id.  To act under the deceptive practices prong, the FTC must show 
that the company made “an affirmative representation about the level of security it provided.”  David 
C. Grossman, Comment, Blaming the Victim: How FTC Data Security Enforcement Actions Make 
Companies and Consumers More Vulnerable to Hackers, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1283, 1302 (2016).  
Because of this limitation, the FTC primarily uses the unfair practices prong, which views the 
company’s failure to implement “reasonable and appropriate” data security standards as presumptively 
unfair to consumers.  Id. at 1303.  Although the FTC has brought more enforcement actions over the 
years, there have been surprisingly few given the number of data security breaches that occur each 
year.  As of June 2015, the FTC had only ever brought around fifty enforcement actions in the data 
breach context.  Id. (citing FED. TRAD. COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 
(2015), https://www.bulkorder.ftc.gov/system/files/publications/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2M45-QUWW]). 
 36.   Glenn Fleishman, Equifax Data Breach, One Year Later: Obvious Errors and No Real 
Changes, New Report Says, FORTUNE (Sept. 8, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/09/07/equifax-data-
breach-one-year-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/SJ68-8NHQ]. 
 37.   Id.   
 38.   The Data Care Act, introduced in December 2018, would “impose fiduciary duties on 
‘online service providers’ that collect individually identifying data about users,” would require them 
to “reasonably secure personally identifiable information” and notify users if systems were breached.  
Jeffrey Atteberry, In-House Counsel: Keep an Eye on Proposed Federal Privacy Legislation, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 6, 2019), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/0b824b4b-0c09-49cc-b695-
ce6ccf7b85a7/?context=1000516. 
 39.   For example, the 2016 Uber data breach involved rider and driver data from every state.  
Kate Conger, Uber Settles Data Breach Investigation for $148 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018, 
4:35 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/technology/uber-data-breach.html [https://perma.cc/ 
H8PV-QMH5].  See Jill Joerling, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argument for a Comprehensive 
Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 467, 486 (2010) (referring to the 
“patchwork” of state notification laws and proposing that a federal law is necessary for comprehensive 
coverage).   
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breach” and other key terms differently, set different breach notification 
parameters, and may or may not mandate security safeguards.40  When a 
breach does occur, the costs businesses incur navigating this complex web 
of state laws can be prohibitive. 
Another significant barrier to passage of federal legislation is the issue 
of preemption.  In the absence of federal regulation, state legislatures have 
stepped into this regulating role primarily by implementing mandatory 
breach notification statutes.41  Some jurisdictions, including Kansas, have 
gone further, imposing a statutory duty on businesses to use reasonable 
care in collecting, maintaining, and disposing of consumer information.42  
California passed the first breach notification law in 200343 and remains 
the trailblazer in data security and privacy regulation.  It recently passed 
two novel pieces of legislation: the first requires “reasonable security 
feature[s]” for internet-connected devices,44 such as fitness trackers, cars, 
and refrigerators, and the second gives consumers broad rights with 
respect to their own data (e.g., the right to know how their data is used, the 
right to request that a business delete their data, and the right to opt out of 
data selling practices).45 
States arguably have a higher stake in regulating entities holding 
resident data and better understand the nature of their businesses and the 
needs of their residents.46  Comfortable with the statutes they have had in 
place for years, many states staunchly oppose preemption.47  In March 
2018, thirty-two states’ attorneys general signed a letter addressed to the 
                                                          
 40.   See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, Breach Notification Law Interactive Map, 
https://www.bakerlaw.com/BreachNotificationLawMap [https://perma.cc/BMS7-XF7N] (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2019) (highlighting the major differences between state notification laws).  
 41.   See id. 
 42.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,139b(b) (Supp. 2017). 
 43.   Timothy H. Skinner, California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First 
State Breach Notification Law is not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft Legislation, 
10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, n. 10–11 (2003). 
 44.   See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.04(a) (operative Jan. 1, 2020). 
 45.   California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which will go into effect starting January 1, 
2020, grants consumers rights similar to the GDPR’s data portability rights. CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1798.100–1798.199.  
 46.   Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency Through a State-
Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 45, 64 (2015).  See also Sara A. Needles, The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based 
Approach to Data Breach Notification Law, 8 N.C.L. REV. 267, 272 (arguing that “principles of 
federalism, preemption, and the inflexibility of federal law expose the feebleness of a federal approach 
for data protection.”). 
 47.   Letter from Lisa Madigan, Ill. Attorney Gen., to the Committee on Financial Services 2 
(Mar. 19, 2018), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2018_03/Committee_Leaders 
_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF94-6VB7] (noting thirty-two attorneys general oppose federal 
legislation that would preempt state laws).   
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Committee on Financial Services in response to the proposed Data 
Acquisition and Technology Accountability and Security Act.48  The 
letter, penned by Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, asserted that 
states are better equipped to handle data breaches and enforce 
cybersecurity standards than the federal government because of their 
ability to investigate breaches, address the concerns of affected residents, 
and adapt legislation to changing technology.49  Madigan expressed 
concern that the proposed legislation would only capture large, national 
breaches while “preventing attorneys general from learning of or 
addressing breaches that have a smaller national scale but nonetheless 
victimize our state residents.”50  As debates on the merits of federal data 
security regulation rage on, state statutes continue to provide direction to 
businesses and offer transparency to consumers.  Section II.A explains 
why data breaches create such risk to consumers, and Section II.B 
discusses recent Kansas breaches and the Kansas legislature’s response. 
A. What is a Data Breach? 
Although the definition varies by statute, the ITRC defines “data 
breach” as “an incident in which an individual name plus a social security 
number, driver’s license number, medical record or financial record 
(credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at risk because of 
exposure.”51  Breaches occur in a variety of ways, but the five most 
common are: (1) hacking, (2) unauthorized access, (3) employee error and 
negligence, (4) accidental exposure, and (5) physical theft.52  Hacking was 
the number one cause of data breaches in 2018—of 1,244 total breaches 
reported, 482 incidents were caused by hacking.53  Hackers target data 
sources containing sensitive personal information, such as social security 
numbers, to open new credit card accounts, apply for loans, and commit 
other fraudulent acts.54  Once a consumer’s social security number is 
stolen, the only surefire way to protect against identity theft is to obtain a 
new social security number, which is extremely difficult.55 
                                                          
 48.   Id. at 1. 
 49.   Id. at 2–3. 
 50.   Id. at 3.  
 51.   IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., Data Breaches, http://www.idtheftcenter.org/Data-
Breaches/data-breaches [https://perma.cc/JA62-D2F7] (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
 52.   2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 11, at 10. 
 53.   Id. at 9–10.  
 54.   Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn Lamacchia, Cybersecurity Liability: How Technically Savvy 
Can We Expect Small Business Owners to Be?, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217, 221–22 (2018). 
 55.   Stephen Jones, Comment, Data Breaches, Bitcoin, and Blockchain Technology: A Modern 
2019 KANSANS AT RISK 831 
Consumers are not the only ones harmed by data breaches.  Breaches 
cost U.S. companies an average $7.91 million per year.56  The Ponemon 
Institute estimates that businesses lose $148 per leaked record.57  The U.S. 
also has the highest notification cost in the world at $740,000.58  Juniper 
Research estimates that “data breaches will cost businesses [globally] a 
total of $8 trillion over the next five years.”59 
B. Why is this Important for Kansas? 
Kansas has one of the most lenient data breach notification statutes in 
the country.60  In its current form, the Kansas statute is of little help to 
businesses and consumers.  Kansas should follow other states and expand 
the scope of data covered under the statute, adopt a set deadline by which 
notification must be given, and set guidelines for the substance of 
notifications. 
Data security is on the Kansas Legislature’s radar.  In 2016, Kansas 
joined a number of states in adopting data security standards for any data-
collecting entity.61  The statute, treated as “part of and supplemental to the 
Kansas consumer protection act,” is inconspicuously tucked away in the 
Kansas Roofing Registration Act.62  It requires “holder[s] of personal 
information” (defined in the same way as the KPCI statutes) to: (1) 
“maintain reasonable procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of 
the information,” (2) “exercise reasonable care to protect the personal 
information,” and (3) “take reasonable steps to destroy” any records the 
                                                          
Approach to the Data-Security Crisis, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 783, 788 (2018).  
 56.   PONEMON INST., 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 15 (2018), 
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/861MNWN2 [https://perma.cc/7LF2-TSVE] [hereinafter 2018 
COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY]. 
 57.   Id. at 3. 
 58.   Id. at 9 (explaining that “[t]hese costs include the creation of contact databases, 
determination of all regulatory requirements, engagement of outside experts, postal expenditures, 
email bounce-backs and inbound communication setups”). 
 59.   Press Release, Juniper Research, Cybercrime to Cost Global Business Over $8 Trillion in 
the Next 5 Years (May 30, 2017), https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/cybercrime-
to-cost-global-business-over-$8-trn [https://perma.cc/6RWC-SH4J]. 
 60.   Zhang, supra note 5. 
 61.   In 2016, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Utah had laws establishing data security standards for 
businesses.  Data Security Laws: Private Sector, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-security-
laws.aspx.  Since 2016, the following states have adopted laws establishing data security standards for 
private businesses: Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia.  Id.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,139b 
(Supp. 2017) (tasking holders of personal information to exercise “reasonable care”). 
 62.   Id. § 50-6,139b(g). 
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holder does not intend to keep.63  Violations of the statute are treated as 
“unconscionable acts[s] or practice[s] in violation of K.S.A. 50-627,” the 
Kansas Consumer Protection Act.64  The statute neither creates nor permits 
a private cause of action, reserving all actions for the attorney general.65 
In addition, the Cybersecurity Act, enacted May 2018, created the 
Kansas Information Security Office and established an information 
technology executive council to address data security issues relating to 
executive branch agencies.66  The Cybersecurity Act is likely a response 
to two recent breaches involving state agencies.  On March 14, 2017, the 
Kansas Department of Commerce discovered and isolated a breach, 
caused by hackers, which exposed more than 5.5 million individuals’ 
social security numbers from multiple states.67  The hackers also exposed 
an additional 805,000 user accounts that did not contain social security 
numbers.68  The breach cost the state $175,000 in legal services through 
December 31, 2017, and approximately $60,000 for an IT contract to 
identify the compromised user accounts and fix the coding error the 
hackers exploited.69  The State agreed to pay “for up to a year of credit 
monitoring services for victims in nine of the [ten] affected states,” though 
this is not required by Kansas law.70 
The State’s response to the breach has been criticized for its lack of 
transparency—the breach only came to light after the Kansas News 
Service filed a Kansas freedom of information request.71  Further, out of 
the 5.5 million individuals affected by the breach, the Department of 
Commerce only emailed about 260,000 victims because “it did not have 
email addresses for all users.”72  The KPCI does not require entities to 
notify victims by mail or telephone.73 
                                                          
 63.   Id. § 50-6,139b(b)(1)–(2).  “Holder of personal information . . . means a person who, in the 
ordinary course of business, collects, maintains or possesses, or causes to be collected, maintained or 
possessed, the personal information of any other person.”  Id. § 50-6,139b(a)(1). 
 64.   Id. § 50-6,139b(d). 
 65.   Id. § 50-6,139b(e).  The finer details and implications of this statute are beyond the scope of 
this Note.  
 66.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7202 (Supp. 2017). 
 67.   Celia Llopis-Jepsen, Hackers of Kansas System Accessed Social Security Numbers of 
Millions in 10 States, KCUR 89.3 (July 20, 2017), http://www.kcur.org/post/hackers-kansas-system-
accessed-social-security-numbers-millions-10-states#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/UHR3-7S3C]. 
 68.   Id.  
 69.   Id.  
 70.   Id.  
 71.   Ed Silverstein, Response to Kansas Department of Commerce Breach Suggests ‘Poor 
Behavior’, LEGALTECH NEWS (July 27, 2017), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/164fe0de-
849c-455f-9e85-ceec3f681d05/?context=1000516. 
 72.   Llopis-Jepsen, supra note 67.  
 73.   Id.  
2019 KANSANS AT RISK 833 
On February 23, 2018, a breach of the Kansas Department of Aging 
and Disability Services revealed confidential health information.74  The 
breach disclosed, among other things, names, social security numbers, 
birth dates, and Medicaid identification numbers.75  An employee 
improperly disclosed the information in an email sent to multiple local 
contractors.76  Democratic Representative Jeff Pittman, in a debate on the 
Kansas House floor, noted the inconsistencies in data security between 
state agencies, stating: “We are not doing a good job in terms of keeping 
our data secure.”77  With the Kansas Legislature’s attention recently 
focused on data security and cybersecurity, now may be the best time to 
update the KPCI statutes.  Other states’ notification statutes may provide 
a sound model for such updates. 
C. A Brief Survey of State Notification Laws 
In the absence of uniform federal regulation, states have stepped in to 
offer greater protection to their citizens.  The protection has primarily 
taken the form of notification statutes.78  State notification statutes require 
companies, under particular circumstances, to inform consumers that their 
personal information has been or may have been exposed.79  California 
pioneered the first data breach notification law in 2003,80 designed to curb 
identity theft by warning data breach victims when their personal 
information is compromised.81  Fourteen states followed suit, modeling 
their own breach notification laws after California’s.82  As of March 2018, 
                                                          
 74.   News Release, Kan. Dep’t for Aging and Disability Servs., KDADS Notifies Consumers 
About Potential Breach of Protected Health Information (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.kdads.ks.gov 
/media-center/news-releases/2018/03/01/kdads-notifies-consumers-about-potential-breach-of-
protected-health-information [https://perma.cc/PPM2-QDB4].  
 75.   Elizabeth Snell, Reported Kansas PHI Data Breach Could Involve Info of 11K, HEALTH IT 
SECURITY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/reported-kansas-phi-data-breach-could-
involve-info-of-11k [https://perma.cc/2XNV-G6SK]. 
 76.   Stephen Koranda, Kansas Aging Agency Spills Personal Information of 11,000 People, 
KCUR 89.3 (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.kcur.org/post/kansas-aging-agency-spills-personal-
information-11000-people#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/Z35H-68BP]. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/PB2J-9GFH]. 
 79.   See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (Deering, LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 715C.2 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3074 (LEXIS through 2018 
Leg.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-803 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-12-501 (LEXIS through Mar. 31 of 2019 Gen. Sess.). 
 80.   CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (Deering, LEXIS through 2019 Sess.). 
 81.   See Skinner, supra note 43, at nn.10–11. 
 82.   See RANDY GAINER, MEALEY’S PRIVACY REPORT: POTENTIAL BUSINESS LIABILITY FOR 
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all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands have data breach notification laws.83  Alabama and South 
Dakota were last to adopt such statutes in the wake of the Equifax breach 
and enactment of the GDPR.84  Many states have since amended their 
notification statutes to expand the scope of information covered and 
implement or refine mandatory reporting deadlines.85 
There is commonality between state notification statutes.  For 
example, all fifty states and U.S. territories include an encryption safe 
harbor, meaning that entities do not have to notify consumers if 
compromised data was encrypted.86  Significant variations do exist, 
however, between state notification statutes.  This section explores those 
variations. 
1. Defining “Personal Information” 
State notification statutes differ in how they define “personal 
information” subject to notification if compromised.  The narrowest 
definition of “personal information” is “[a]n individual’s first name or first 
initial and last name” plus (1) social security number, (2) driver’s license 
or identification card number, or (3) financial account number or credit or 
debit card number.87  Thirty-three states, Washington D.C., and Puerto 
Rico, however, have expanded definitions of “personal information.”88  
For example, fourteen states include unique biometric data as a protected 
data element, such as fingerprints, voice recognition, or retina scanning.89  
                                                          
FAILURE TO SECURE CONSUMER DATA (2005), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/c923acfb-
72b7-4232-b949-9f9508e3482d/?context=1000516 (noting that fourteen states “enacted notification 
statutes generally modeled on California’s statute” in the span of a few months in 2005). 
 83.   Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., US States Pass Data Protection Laws on the Heels of the GDPR, 
DATA PROTECTION REP. (July 9, 2018), https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/07/u-s-states-
pass-data-protection-laws-on-the-heels-of-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/6W8N-55E9].  
 84.   See Julie Hein, Navigating the State Data Breach Laws? An Enhanced Resource is 
Available, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/data-
breach-notification-laws/navigating-the-state-data-breach-laws-an-enhanced-resource-is-available/ 
[https://perma.cc/22X9-KQ66]. 
      85.      Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., supra note 83.  
 86.   See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 40.   
 87.   See id.  Kansas is classified as having a narrow definition.  Id. 
 88.   The following states have expanded definitions of “personal information”: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See id.   
 89.   ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 18-551(7)(a)(i) & (11)(i) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2019 legislation); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(1)(g)(I)(A) (LEXIS through 2018 legislation); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 6, 
§ 12B-101(7)(a)(8) (LEXIS through 2018); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/5(1)(F) (LexisNexis, 
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Many states also include medical information, health insurance policy 
information, and online account information (e.g., usernames or emails, 
plus any passwords or security questions and answers).90  Some states go 
even further and include passport number, taxpayer identification number, 
date of birth, and an individual’s mother’s maiden name.91 
2. Whether Notice is Required Within a Specific Time Frame 
Although early notification statutes did not specify set deadlines for 
breach notification,92 states are increasingly amending statutes to include 
specific deadlines.  Nineteen states now require notification within a set 
“window” after discovery of a breach.93  Colorado and Florida have the 
strictest notification periods, requiring notification no later than thirty days 
after a breach discovery.94  The most common notification period—
adopted by Alabama, Arizona, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Maryland, 
                                                          
LEXIS through P.A. 101-1 of 2019 Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.1(11)(a)(5) (LEXIS through 
2018 Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3073(4)(a)(v) (LEXIS through 2018 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 14-3501(e)(1)(i)(6) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. Ann. § 
87-802(5)(a)(v) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-2 (LexisNexis, LEXIS 
through 2019 Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-113.20(b)(11) (LEXIS through S.L. 2018-145 of 2018 
Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.602(11)(a)(A)(v) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 22-40-19(4)(e) (LEXIS through Feb. 27, 2019 legislation); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98(1)(b)(5) 
(LEXIS through 2017–2018 Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-901(b)(xiii) (LEXIS through Mar. 31, 
2019 legislation). 
 90.   MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500(1)(9)(e) & (f) (LEXIS through 2018 legislation) (including 
medical information and health insurance policy number); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1702 (LEXIS 
through Feb. 28, 2019 legislation) (including insurance policy numbers); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802(5) 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS 2019 Sess.) (including unique identification number or routing code, biometric 
data, username, email address, and passwords or security questions and answers); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 646A.602(11)(a)(A) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.) (including passport number or other U.S.-issued 
identification number, biometric data, health insurance information, and medical information); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-40-19(4) & (5) (LEXIS through Feb. 27, 2019 legislation) (including health 
information and usernames and emails).  
 91.   MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1702(7) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.) (including passport 
numbers); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.) (including date of birth, 
mother’s maiden name, medical information, health insurance information, digitized or electronic 
signature, identification number assigned by employer with security code, access code, or password); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.602(11)(a)(A) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.) (including passport number or 
other U.S.-issued identification number, biometric data, health insurance information, and medical 
information). 
 92.   See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (requiring disclosure “in the most expedient time 
possible and without unreasonable delay”).  
 93.   Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin all require notification to consumers within a particular window 
after a breach is discovered.  See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 40. 
 94.   COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(2) (LEXIS through 2018 Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
501.171(3)(a) (LEXIS through 2018 Sess.).  
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Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wisconsin—is within forty-five days of a breach discovery.95  Delaware 
and South Dakota require notification within sixty days of a breach 
discovery,96 and Connecticut has the longest enumerated deadline at 
ninety days.97  The remaining states, including Kansas, do not specify a 
deadline, instead opting for general language requiring notification “in the 
most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay.”98 
3. Whether Notice to the Attorney General or a State Agency is 
Required 
Thirty-five states and Puerto Rico require entities to notify the attorney 
general after a breach occurs, under certain circumstances.99  In New York 
and Virginia, for example, no matter the size of the breach, the entity must 
notify the attorney general if the breach includes personal information.100  
Missouri, however, only requires entities to notify the attorney general and 
consumer reporting agencies if 1,000 or more persons are affected by the 
breach.101 
                                                          
 95.   ALA. CODE § 8-38-5(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 18-
552(B) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(b)(3) 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-6(A) (LexisNexis, LEXIS 
through 2019 Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12(B)(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through file) (state 
agencies) & 1349.19(B)(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through file 172) (persons and businesses); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 646A.604(3)(a) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.3-4(a)(2) (2018) 
(LEXIS through Jan. 2019 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(b) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); 
VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, § 2435(b)(1) (LEXIS through 2017 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
19.255.010(16) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 Sess.) & 42.56.590(15) (LexisNexis, LEXIS 
through 2018 Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98(3)(a) (LEXIS through 2017–2018 Sess.). 
 96.   DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 6, § 12B-102(c) (LEXIS through 82 Del. Laws, ch. 4); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-40-20 (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.). 
 97.   CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36A-701B(b)(1) (LEXIS through 2018 Sess.). 
 98.   See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(a) (Supp. 2018). See also ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.48.010(a) (LEXIS through 2018 Sess.); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) ; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 899-aa(2) (Consol., LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(B) (LEXIS through 
2018 Sess.). 
 99.   The following states require notification to the attorney general: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.  See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, 
supra note 40.   
 100.   N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(8)(a) (Consol., LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 18.2-186.6(B) (LEXIS through 2018 Sess.) & 32.1-127.1:05(B) (LEXIS through 2018 Sess.). 
 101.   MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500(2)(8) (LEXIS through 2018 legislation). 
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4. Whether a Private Cause of Action is Permitted 
Sixteen states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands 
all provide for a private cause of action.102  All other states and Guam 
either do not explicitly provide a private cause of action or only allow suits 
brought by the attorney general.103 
5. Whether a Form of Notification is Specified 
Many states also specify what information must be included in 
notification to data breach victims.  Generally, these requirements include: 
(1) name and contact information for the reporting entity, (2) the type of 
information disclosed, and (3) telephone numbers and addresses of major 
credit reporting agencies.104  Some statutes provide more transparency, 
requiring: (1) a description of the breach, (2) approximate date of the 
breach, and (3) advice to the consumer to report suspected identity theft to 
law enforcement.105  Twenty-four states, including Kansas, Washington 
D.C., and Guam have no specific content requirements.106 
D. Kansas Protection of Consumer Information Statutes 
Current Kansas notification statutes are lenient and do not adequately 
protect consumers or incentivize safe data security practices.  This Section 
will introduce the KPCI data breach statutes to identify weaknesses.  
The KPCI statutes were enacted in 2006 and have not been updated 
since.107  The statutes require individuals, corporations, governments, and 
                                                          
 102.   Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington 
provide for a private cause of action.  See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 40. 
 103.   See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500(4) (LEXIS through 2018 legislation); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-12-502(f) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.).  
 104.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(E); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-502(e). 
 105.   CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(d) (requiring information on what happened, what information 
was involved, what the entity is doing to rectify the situation, what the consumer can do in the 
meantime, and additional information); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(2)(a.2); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-
3852 (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-2(d) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018 
Sess.); IOWA CODE § 715C.2(5) (LEXIS through 2018 Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-7 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.604(5) (LEXIS through 2019 
Sess.). 
 106.   See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010–.090 (LEXIS through 2018 legislation); IDAHO CODE 
§ 28-51-105 (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01 (Supp. 2018); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 30-14-1701-02 & 1704 (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2018); TIT. 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 48.30 (LEXIS through P.L. 34-130). 
 107.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01–50-7a04 (Supp. 2018). 
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other entities that conduct business in Kansas and own, license, or 
maintain consumer information to “conduct in good faith a reasonable and 
prompt investigation to determine the likelihood that personal information 
has been or will be misused” after discovering a breach.108  The statutes, 
however, provide no guidance for what constitutes a “reasonable and 
prompt investigation.”  The KPCI statutes also narrowly define “personal 
information,” as a consumer’s first name or first initial and last name plus 
any one or more of the following unencrypted or unredacted data elements: 
(1) social security number, (2) driver’s license number or state 
identification card number, or (3) financial account number, or credit or 
debit card number.109 
Notice is only required if the investigation “determines that the misuse 
of information has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur.”110  
Essentially, entities must first perform a risk-assessment.  If the entity 
determines that there is a high risk of misuse, it must give notice “as soon 
as possible to the affected Kansas resident . . . in the most expedient time 
possible and without unreasonable delay.”111  This vague standard leaves 
Kansas consumers unaware that their data has been compromised for an 
undisclosed period of time. 
Even if notice is required, the KPCI statutes do not specify what 
information should be included in notification to Kansas consumers.  The 
form of notification is also lax.  The statutes define “notice” as “(1) written 
notice; (2) electronic notice . . .; or (3) substitute notice . . . .”112  
Substitute notice requires email notice, conspicuous posting on the entity’s 
webpage, and “notification to major statewide media.”113  An entity may 
provide substitute notice if: (1) the cost of notice will exceed $100,000, 
(2) it needs to notify more than 5,000 people, or (3) it “does not have 
sufficient contact information to provide notice.”114  The State used 
substitute notice to notify Kansas consumers after the Department of 
Commerce’s breach in 2017.115 
Although the KPCI statutes do not provide an explicit private right of 
action for data breach victims,116 the statutes do not foreclose the 
                                                          
 108.   Id. § 50-7a02(a).  
 109.   Id. § 50-7a01(g)(1)-(3). 
 110.   Id. § 50-7a02(a). 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id. § 50-7a01(c). 
 113.   Id. § 50-7a01(e).  
 114.   Id. § 50-7a01(c)(3). 
 115.   Llopis-Jepsen, supra note 67.  
 116.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01–7a04. 
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possibility of a private remedy for violation.  Section 50-7a02(g) provides 
that “[t]he provisions of this section are not exclusive and do not relieve 
an individual or commercial entity subject to this section from compliance 
with all other applicable provisions of the law.”117  This means that entities 
must comply with other federal and state laws governing data breaches, 
but it may also mean that other causes of action, such as an unfair or 
deceptive practices claim or negligence claim, are on the table.  In the 
massive Target data breach litigation, the Minnesota District Court found 
the words “not exclusive” in the Kansas data breach notification statute to 
be sufficiently ambiguous to justify denying Target’s motion to dismiss 
Kansas consumers’ negligence claims.118 
The breach notification statute could form the basis of a statutory duty 
to provide notification after a breach, enabling a private negligence claim 
if an unjustified delay in notification causes a data breach victim’s injury.  
Aside from this, the attorney general may bring an action at law or in 
equity to enforce the provision and enjoin future violations.119  However, 
enforcement by the attorney general is rare.  The most notable example of 
attorney general enforcement is the Uber settlement, which the Kansas 
attorney general led on behalf of Kansas consumers.120 
Lastly, the statutes include several safe harbors.  First, encrypted or 
redacted data, if compromised, does not have to be reported at all.121  This 
encourages entities to invest in data encryption to avoid the expenses of 
notification.  Second, a state or federally-regulated entity that complies 
with the laws, regulations, or guidelines of its “primary or functional state 
or federal regulator is deemed to be in compliance with this section.”122  
Third, notification in accordance with an entity’s own procedures and 
policies, as long as they are “consistent with the timing requirements” of 
the statute, is sufficient to comply with this section.123 
                                                          
 117.   Id. § 50-7a02(g). 
 118.   In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1169 (D. Minn. 
2014) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(g)). 
 119.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(g).  Analysis of the viability of such claims is beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
 120.   Moore, supra note 25.  
 121.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(g). 
 122.   Id. § 50-7a02(e).  
 123.   Id. § 50-7a02(d). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Why Make Changes? 
Consumers deserve to know when their personal information is 
compromised,124 and the entities holding this data are in the best position 
to notify consumers.  The primary purpose of data breach notification 
statutes “is to empower consumers” to take measures to secure their data 
post-breach.125 
While data breaches can result in significant financial harm, few data 
breach victims suffer such harm.  Rather, the primary consequence of a 
data breach is stress and loss of time and money spent monitoring credit, 
closing accounts, and addressing any red flags.126  Banks and credit card 
issuers resolve many cases of fraud involving bank account and credit card 
information.127  This creates another victim, however, as these institutions 
bear the incredible costs of issuing new bank cards and closing 
accounts.128  For example, after the 2013 Target breach, banks and credit 
card issuers dished out approximately $172 million to reissue cards 
alone.129  Aside from these forms of financial crime, the breach of highly 
confidential information leaves individuals open to identity theft.  The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that 26 million individuals—or 
“10% of all U.S. residents age 16 or older”—reported an incident of 
identity theft in 2016.130  Around 51% of identity theft victims did not 
discover the incident until “a financial institution contacted them about 
suspicious activity on their account.”131 
Breach notification laws, if done correctly, can provide consumers the 
time and information necessary to take protective action and reduce their 
risk of identity theft.  Breach notifications also remind consumers to 
                                                          
 124.   Burdon, supra note 31, at 66.  
 125.   LILLIAN ABLON ET AL., CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS 
AND LOSS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 28 (2016), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
research_reports/RR1100/RR1187/RAND_RR1187.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YQ5-T2T8].  
 126.   PONEMON INST., THE AFTERMATH OF A DATA BREACH: CONSUMER SENTIMENT 1 (2014), 
https://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/Consumer%20Study%20on%20Aftermath%20of%20a%
20Breach%20FINAL%202.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RX7-NBEJ] [hereinafter THE AFTERMATH OF A 
DATA BREACH: CONSUMER SENTIMENT].  76% of respondents reported feeling stressed after learning 
of a data breach involving their information.  Id. at 6.  
 127.   Tschider, supra note 46, at 50–51.  
 128.   Id.  
 129.   Id.   
 130.   Erika Harrell, Victims of Identity Theft, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1 (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P8R-GNK3]. 
 131.   Id. at 6.  
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carefully scrutinize who they provide their data to and to practice safe data 
security habits (for example, by diversifying passwords and regularly 
changing them).  A study conducted by the Rand Corporation suggests that 
data breach notifications ultimately serve this purpose.132  After receiving 
a data breach notification, 51% of respondents took protective action, 
including changing passwords or PIN numbers.133  Respondents also 
indicated that they began “monitor[ing] credit card activity more closely,” 
and requested new debit and credit cards.134 
The Rand Corporation study also found that consumers want more 
regulation in this area.  Surveyed respondents showed interest in seeing 
preventative measures to reduce the risk of future breaches, free credit 
monitoring services, and immediate notification to consumers once a 
breach occurs.135  These measures were more likely to improve 
respondents’ satisfaction following a breach than financial 
compensation.136  A 2014 study, conducted by the Ponemon Institute, 
found that consumers want organizations to be required to provide identity 
theft protection, credit monitoring services, and compensatory relief 
through cash, products, or services.137 
Data breach notification laws can also expose weak data security 
infrastructure and incentivize voluntary investment in data security.  In a 
very real way, breach notification is a form of public shaming.  The threats 
of public backlash and possible litigation raise the stakes for businesses 
and encourage preemptive action.138  Broad privacy concerns from 
consumers and strict privacy regulations, such as the GDPR, have spurred 
increased investment in data security.139  Gartner’s recent research 
reported that worldwide spending on data security will “reach over $114 
billion in 2018, an increase of 12.4% from last year.”140  Although 
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regulation increases the amount businesses have to spend on security, the 
improved infrastructure decreases businesses’ costs once a breach 
occurs.141 
Strict notification statutes provide additional incentives for businesses 
to invest in preventative measures.  Increased spending and care can 
increase customer loyalty if consumers know that entities face costly and 
embarrassing notification in the event of a breach.  Strict notification 
statutes also assure consumers that, should a breach occur, the entity must 
notify them promptly. 
B. Concerns with Strict Regulation 
Ponemon’s 2018 study found that 48% of data breach incidents were 
caused by “malicious or criminal attacks.”142  Of all data breach incidents, 
these are the most costly to rectify at $157 per record.143  The backbone of 
the opposition to heightened notification requirements rests in the notion 
that the hacker is a criminal, and the business or organization holding the 
information is the true victim.144  This argument raises a serious question: 
who is responsible for the data, the business or the consumer?  Some argue 
that consumers know the risk of data breaches and “voluntarily surrender 
at least some fraction of their security and privacy” when they choose to 
provide their information to an entity.145  The publicity given to data 
breaches can support this contention.  Consumers are aware that data 
breaches occur. 
Strict regulation and statutory remedies place significant costs on 
businesses.146  On average, businesses suffer an estimated $148 loss per 
leaked record.147  Notification adds to these costs with activities such as 
creating contact databases, researching and complying with regulatory 
requirements, consulting with IT specialists (such as the IT contract 
Kansas entered after the Department of Commerce breach), paying for 
                                                          
 141.   Marian K. Riedy & Bartlomiej Hanus, Yes, Your Personal Data Is at Risk: Get Over It!, 19 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 23 (2016). 
 142.   2018 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY, supra note 56, at 9. 
 143.   Id. 
 144.   Riedy & Hanus, supra note 141, at 29 (stating that “[t]he cybercriminal who hacks the 
database and then sells or uses the data is the true culprit.”).  
 145.   Id. at 32. 
 146.   See, e.g., id. at 19–21 (discussing the immense costs businesses suffer as a result of breaches, 
including remediation costs of repairing and securing databases, networks, and equipment that may 
have been disrupted in the breach; clean-up costs associated with notifying victims of the breach and 
indirect costs such as customer churn; and post-breach costs including fines, penalties, and attorney’s 
fees arising from litigation). 
 147.   2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY, supra note 56, at 3. 
2019 KANSANS AT RISK 843 
postage, and identifying secondary mail contacts.148  When an entity 
suffers a breach involving thousands of records, the cost can become truly 
prohibitive, especially for small businesses.  Meanwhile, the 2014 
Ponemon study found that the average out-of-pocket cost to data breach 
victims was $38.149  Additionally, 34% of the data breach victims surveyed 
stated that they were able to resolve problems resulting from the breach in 
one day.150  Many argue that the consumer is therefore best equipped to 
bear these expenses.  This argument, however, discounts the fact that the 
primary beneficiary of the data is the entity itself. 
In addition to financial loss, businesses fear post-notification 
reputational harm.  At one extreme, critics argue that businesses will make 
more effort to simply conceal breaches rather than comply with breach 
notification laws to prevent reputational harm and litigation, as Uber did 
in 2016.151  This argument has some merit.  A 2016 Symantec report found 
that more companies were not reporting the full extent of their data 
breaches.152  At the other extreme, critics question whether strict 
regulation is necessary to deter businesses from unsafe data security 
practices, arguing instead that businesses already have an incentive to 
invest in data security to protect trade secrets and avoid the costs of a 
breach.153 
A genuine concern is the effect such laws have on small businesses.  
Small businesses have fewer resources than larger companies to mitigate 
risk and respond to breaches.154  Large entities rely on small business 
vendors, which hackers target for easy access to large enterprise data.155  
For example, a hacker caused the 2013 Target breach by gaining access to 
an HVAC contractor working with Targets’ systems.156  Small and midsize 
businesses are also attractive targets because cyber criminals can use 
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automation to “mass produce attacks for little investment.”157  Lastly, 
small business owners tend to discount the value of investing in data 
security, believing that hackers only set their sights on large entities.158  As 
a result, more hackers are targeting small businesses with 250 or less 
employees.  As of March 2017, “half of all cyberattacks target[ed] small 
businesses.”159  Breaches can have profound effects on small businesses, 
which “are far more likely to fail as the result of a breach.”160 
Despite these concerns, businesses––often the primary beneficiaries 
of the data––should bear the costs of notification and take preventative 
action to avoid breaches.  Businesses collect data to improve services and 
to attract more customers through targeted marketing campaigns.  In 
addition, businesses have vast opportunities to sell consumer data to other 
companies, generating revenue.  Because of increased data sharing 
practices, consumers are not in the best position to protect their personal 
information.161  After voluntarily providing information to the initial 
entity, the consumer will not be notified if their information is sold or to 
who.  
Although some scholars treat strict notification requirements as an 
unfair and unreasonable burden on business, fear of public outrage and the 
costs of notification have spurred preemptive investment in data security.  
This has had a profound impact on the technology sector, generating 
technological improvements, an expanding data security job base, better 
staffing, development of response plans, and greater employee awareness 
of how data breaches work and when a breach occurs.162 
Advances in technology will also assist the cyber insurance market in 
adapting risk models.  Although still in its infancy, the cyber insurance 
market is predicted to grow from $500 million a year to $3 billion a year 
by 2025.163  There are unique difficulties in insuring against cyber risks 
because it is largely a recent development.  There are few years of data to 
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build risk models off of and no two data breaches are exactly alike.164  
Increased investment may help develop risk models by creating an even 
larger market for cyber insurance.  Increased investment in data security, 
in other words, fosters innovation in an ever-changing field.  This not only 
benefits businesses and consumers, but also public institutions.  Data 
breaches are not going anywhere.  With time, they only grow in 
sophistication and breadth.  As such, it is important that businesses 
develop data security infrastructure appropriate to the volume and type of 
data gathered.  
The degree to which a business might experience reputational harm 
and the effects of customer churning (loss of customers after a data breach) 
are difficult to estimate.  In past years, large data breaches, such as the 
2012 Target breach, resulted in profound churning.  Target’s net earnings 
post-breach fell 46%.165  In a 2017 Ponemon Report sponsored by 
Centrify, 31% of respondents discontinued their relationship with the 
company post-breach.166  In contrast, the Equifax breach, one of the largest 
and highly-publicized breaches in history, temporarily hurt Equifax’s 
position in the stock market, but it quickly recovered much of its losses.167  
Many predicted that the breach would be the impetus behind major 
changes to the credit-reporting industry.168  Instead, little substantive 
change occurred, although Alabama and North Dakota both passed 
notification laws.169  This absence of loss of business could be a result of 
Equifax’s dominance in the credit-reporting industry.  Low customer 
churn could also be a result of consumer apathy.  Data breaches are now a 
common, unavoidable occurrence. 
Regardless, businesses still fear the consequences of reputational 
harm, providing a powerful incentive for businesses to act preemptively 
by investing more in data security.  Although increased spending does not 
necessarily correlate with a decrease in the number of data breaches, 
largely due to the increasing sophistication of hacking, it does decrease 
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business costs once a breach occurs.170  In essence, it pays off to invest 
now.  The 2018 Ponemon study found that a well-trained incident response 
team saved companies an average $14 per record.171  The 2017 Ponemon 
report found that 113 companies experienced an average 5% decline in 
stock prices immediately after disclosure.172  Companies, however, are 
less likely to see declining stock prices if they have strong data security 
infrastructure.173  With strong infrastructure, companies are better able to 
respond to data breaches and see stock prices recover in an average of 
seven days.174  In contrast, companies with poor data security 
infrastructure experience a slump in stock prices for more than ninety 
days.175  Although businesses might be tempted to avoid reputational harm 
altogether by not notifying consumers, this is a risky decision.  Businesses 
face potential suit by state attorneys general and even greater reputational 
harm, as Uber did for its 2016 data breach.176 
Kansas currently has one of the most lenient breach notification laws 
in the country.  This poses a significant risk to Kansas consumers and to 
Kansas businesses.  Other states are strengthening their notification laws, 
causing businesses in those states to invest more in data security.177  
Increased investment strengthens data security and makes businesses in 
those states less attractive targets to hackers.  Because of Kansas’s lenient 
approach to notification, Kansas businesses may not invest as much as 
those in other states, and therefore make easier targets for hackers. 
C. Proposed Changes 
This Section suggests several alterations to the KPCI statutes, based 
on other states’ models, to attain the ultimate purposes of data breach 
notification laws: (1) to provide enough information to Kansas consumers 
post-breach for them to protect themselves from financial crimes, and (2) 
to provide strong incentive to businesses to invest in data security.  To 
achieve this purpose, it is necessary to expand the definition of “personal 
information,” establish a set deadline for notifying consumers, require 
notification to the Attorney General, and stipulate the form and substance 
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of notification. 
1. Providing a More Expansive Definition of “Personal Information” 
Kansas currently defines “personal information” in an incredibly 
limited way, only requiring notification where name and either (1) social 
security number, (2) driver’s license number or state identification card 
number, or (3) financial account, credit card or debit card number are 
included.178  This narrow definition is likely a relic of the time the data 
breach notification statute was implemented—nearly fourteen years ago in 
2006.179  Since then, businesses have accumulated mass quantities of 
sensitive information, including biometric data, such as fingerprints, blood 
samples, faceprints, and iris scans.180  Biometric data includes “some of 
the most sensitive forms of identification” due to its permanence.181  Once 
captured, the victim can do little to avoid misuse, unlike passwords 
consumers can easily change or accounts they can easily close.182  Because 
of the highly sensitive nature of biometric data, the definition of “personal 
information” in the KPCI statutes should include biometric data. 
In addition to biometric data, the definition of “personal information” 
should include email addresses, passwords, and security questions and 
answers.  Online accounts often contain highly sensitive information.  
Consumers access banking information online, file taxes online, pay rent 
and utilities online, and check credit scores online.  Alternatively, the 
definition of “personal information” could include the basic data elements 
mentioned above and a catch-all, providing maximum flexibility.  The 
catch-all could simply state “any information that, when combined with 
publicly available information, is reasonably likely to result in identity 
theft.”  A downside to a catch-all, however, is that it requires businesses 
to determine what data elements could leave consumers open to identity 
theft.  Because of this ambiguity, the definition of “personal information” 
should include enumerated protected data elements. 
Although some state notification laws include health information, 
inclusion of health information in the KPCI statutes would be detrimental.  
Entities holding protected health information are already subject to 
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HIPAA regulation.183  HIPAA requires notification to individuals with its 
own criteria, including a sixty-day notification period, adequately 
addressing any breach notification concerns.184  Any added regulation in 
this field would place unnecessary difficulties on the many small, rural 
health clinics in Kansas. 
2. Setting a Sixty-Day Notification Period 
The current Kansas data breach notification statutes require 
notification “as soon as possible to the affected Kansas resident . . . . in the 
most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay.”185  A 
notification period should be set in stone to encourage prompt action 
following a breach.  Hackers act quickly after stealing data because they 
know they have a short window before the consumer realizes their data 
has been stolen.186  Quick notification allows victims to monitor their 
credit, secure credit monitoring, and close or open new accounts where 
necessary.187 
In theory, the current standard sounds reasonable, but it is vague.  
Entities might feel the need to react quickly, notifying consumers before 
identifying the source of the breach and ensuring that their networks are 
secure.188  Alternatively, businesses may take their time in notifying 
consumers.189  A set period gives businesses clear expectations of how 
quickly they need to respond and allows them to prioritize their post-
breach activities accordingly.  
Notification within sixty-days of identifying the breach is ideal.  This 
gives businesses of all sizes ample time to identify the cause of the breach 
and secure data and restore systems before notifying those affected.  This 
also discourages entities from taking their time in notifying consumers.  
Entities that fail to notify Kansas consumers within sixty-days, absent a 
criminal investigation or approval of the attorney general, would be 
subject to suit from the attorney general.  In addition, entities that fail to 
notify consumers within sixty-days should be required to provide free 
credit-monitoring services to affected Kansas consumers for at least one 
year after notification.  This is a fair penalty considering the heightened 
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risk Kansas consumers face the longer they remain unaware that their data 
has been compromised. 
3. Requiring Notification to the Attorney General 
Currently, entities experiencing a breach involving Kansas consumer 
information are not required to notify the Kansas attorney general.  This is 
a missed opportunity.  Notification to the Kansas attorney general would 
allow the attorney general to identify businesses and particular sectors that 
are frequent targets of attacks.  This could shed light on weak data security 
infrastructure and highlight room for improvement.  Notification to the 
Kansas attorney general would also help identify entities that are 
maintaining negligible data security standards subject to suit under K.S.A. 
§ 50-6,139b.  As such, entities suffering a breach should be required to 
notify the attorney general if 1,000 or more Kansas residents are affected, 
a common threshold in other state statutes.190  Entities should notify the 
attorney general within sixty days of determining that a breach has 
occurred. 
4. Indicating Form and Substance of Notification 
The current Kansas data breach notification statute does not specify 
what information should be included in breach notifications to Kansas 
consumers.  The statute should provide at least some guidance to entities 
after a breach.  Alabama’s statute, for example, is a strong model of what 
Kansas should require in notifications: (1) name and contact information 
for the reporting entity, (2) the type of information breached, (3) the 
actions the entity is taking to restore confidentiality, (4) the number and 
address for major credit reporting agencies, (5) the approximate date of 
the breach, and (6) advice to the consumer on what they can do to secure 
their data privacy and prevent identity theft.191  Although some states 
require a description of the breach, including the cause, this information 
should not be required.  If the entity was hacked, it may wish to include 
such information to minimize responsibility.  Consumers may react more 
generously if the breach was caused by a malicious external attack rather 
than a negligent internal actor. 
These notification requirements benefit both victims and entities.  
Without guidance on what to include in notifications, entities run the risk 
of including too little information and potentially subjecting themselves to 
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suit by the attorney general.  Offering too little information also alienates 
data breach victims, who may perceive the lack of transparency as a 
disregard for their privacy and minimization of the seriousness of the 
situation.  This could result in more reputational harm than necessary and 
subsequent customer churning.  More information makes the entity appear 
more transparent and assures the customer that the entity is concerned with 
handling the situation, which may help avoid customer churning. 
Detailed notifications also benefit consumers.  After all, the purpose 
of breach notification is to empower data breach victims to take remedial 
action to avoid becoming victims of fraud.192  Notifications that do not 
specify what data was compromised do little to assist consumers.  
Consumers remain unaware of what accounts they need to monitor, what 
cards they need to cancel, or what passwords they need to change.  In 
addition, the ITRC recently launched a new remediation tool, giving 
consumers case-by-case assistance post-breach.193  Vague notifications 
detract from the effectiveness of the remediation tool—the ITRC “cannot 
provide the affected consumers the action plans they need and deserve 
because [ITRC] cannot assess what their true risk is.”194  To ensure that 
Kansas consumers receive the best possible assistance with the new 
remediation tool, it is necessary to prescribe the substance of notification. 
Beyond the substance of the notification, Kansas should modify the 
form of notice.  Notification requirements should follow a structured 
notification system, with higher notification requirements for more 
sensitive data.  For example, if the data exposed includes names and social 
security numbers, the data breach victim is at an extremely high risk for 
identity theft and the business should notify the victim strictly by post or 
phone.  Substitute notice should be unavailable in these situations.  For 
data breaches involving less sensitive data—such as name, date of birth, 
and credit card number—notice may be provided through email or 
substitute notice (in accordance with the current requirements). 
Businesses would benefit from a hierarchy of notification 
requirements because direct contact is better-received by aggrieved 
consumers.  A 2005 Ponemon survey showed that entities were three times 
less likely to lose business if notification was given via phone call or 
mailed letter, as opposed to email notification.195 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of federal regulation, states have taken a greater role in 
regulating businesses that gather, maintain, and use consumer information.  
Data breach notification statutes are often the primary deterrent—through 
the threat of reputational harm—of negligent data security practices and 
the primary incentive for businesses to invest more in data security.  Data 
breach notification statutes are necessary for consumers to mitigate their 
risk of identity theft or fraudulent charges.  These statutes, however, are 
only effective if strong and clear.  The current Kansas data breach 
notification laws are lax and should be strengthened to expand the 
definition of “personal information,” include a hard deadline by which 
affected individuals must be notified, require notification to the attorney 
general to assist in identifying data breach trends, and include guidelines 
on the form and substance of notification. 
Other states have reacted strongly to the Equifax breach and are taking 
data security more seriously than ever.  Kansas should keep stride with 
other states and impose stronger breach notification requirements to 
protect Kansas consumers and improve the general data security 
infrastructure of Kansas businesses.  Failure to do so could leave Kansas 
entities attractive targets to hackers, as other states make efforts to improve 
data security. 
 
